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BILLS AND NOTES-LIABILITY OF INDORSERS OF NoN-NEGOTIABLE NoTEs-

A made a non-negotiable note to B. B indorsed "Pay to the order of C." C
indorsed to D. All the transfers were for value. The note was not paid on
maturity and D brought suit against B. Held: B was liable as indorser.
Neutzel v. Mackie, 253 Pac. i66 (Cal. x922).
Courts are not agreed as to the extent and nature of the liability of a
transferor of non-negotiable paper on his indorsement. One line of authority
holds that the indorser intends to make himself liable in some capacity and
accordingly these courts construe his contract of liability to be that of a surety,'
while others that of a maker or guarantor.2 Another view considers that the
mere indorsement shows no intention to assume any liability,' but is merely an
assignment of the indorser's rights in the instrument.' However, if from the
nature of the indorsement an expressed intention to assume liability can be
inferred, these courts will give such effect to the indorsement. Thus if the
note is indorsed "to order" or "to bearer" or similar expressions it will be presumed that the indorser intended to assume a contract of liability.' But if the
note is merely indorsed in blank, no stch construction will be given to the
inddrsement.' In the principal case and in another recent case," it was contended
that by such indorsements the notes were rendered negotiable. Where the note
was indorsed in blank, the argument was that by indorsing in blank, the note
became payable to bearer by section 9 (5)of the Negotiable Instrumenti Law."
In the principal case, it was contended that the holder could write over the
signature of the indorser any contract consistent with the character of the
indorsement. The courts in both instances promptly refuted the argument by
calling attention to the fact that the Negotiable Instruments Law deals only
with negotiable instruments and not with non-negotiable paper. These decisions
seem proper.
"Bank of Luverne v. Sharp, 152 Ala. 589, 44 So. 871 (I9O6); Wettlaufer
v.Baxter, 137 Ky. 362, 125 S. W. 741 (I9IO).
2
Sweester v. French, 54 Mass. 262 (1847) ; Seymour v.Van Slych, 8 Wend.
421 (N. Y. 1832) ; Johnson v. Lassiter, 155 N. C. 47, 71 S.E. 23 (9,II).
'Kendall v. Parker, 103 Cal. 319, 37 Pac. 401 (894) ; Citizens' Nat'l Bank
v. Piollet, 126 Pa. 194, 17 Atl. 603 (1889); Shafftal v. McDaniel, 152 Pa. 598,
25 AtI. 576 (1893).
'Platte Plow Co. v. Beard, 27 Okla. 239, 1io Pac. 752 (1910).
'Brenzer v. Wightman, 7 Watts & S. 264 (Pa. i844) ; Kline v. Keiser, 87
Pa. 485 (1878) ;.Carruth v.Walker, 8 Wis. 252 (i86o).
'South Bend Iron Works v. Paddock, 37 Kan. 5io, i5Pac. 574 (1887).
'Foley v. Hardy, 253 Pac. 238 (Kan. i927).
'NEGoIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 9 (5), "'The instrument is payable to
bearer when the only or last indorsement is in blank."
'NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 35, "The holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement by writing over the signature of the indorser any contract consistent with the character of the indorsement."
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CONTEMPT-USE OF THE POWER TO PROTECt A PRisoNER's RIGHT OF PRI-

VAcY-At the opening of a sensational murder trial the presiding judge issued
an order prohibiting the taking of photographs in the court or its precinci
during the conduct of the trial. Prior to this, the judge, in chambers, had been
disturbed by the noise accompanying the photographing of the accused, against
his will, in the corridor. The judge called the photographer before him and
ordered him to surrender the plate. The latter deliberately deceived the judge
by giving up a blank plate. During the course of the trial another photographer
secretly took several snapshots in the courtroom. Subsequently all the pictures
were published in a newspaper. Held: The photographers and those who, with
knowledge, authorized the publication of the pictures were guilty of contempt
of court. Ex parte Stur, 136 Atl. 312 (Md. 1927).
This decision involves, primarily, the consideration of two questions: the
prisoner's right of privacy, and the court's protection of the right by the exercise of its contempt power. The first question has come up on several occasions
in a somewhat different form in the so-called "rogues' gallery" cases, where one
accused of crime has been forced to submit to the making and filing of his
photograph for police records. These cases have usually held that such taking
and using of a prisoner's picture is permissible after conviction.1 If there has
been an acquittal it has been decreed that the picture must be destroyed, on the
theory that the right of privacy of the accused has been invaded.? However, as
the pictures in the principal case were not used for police purposes, the "rogues'
gallery" cases are not in point. Consequently, the prisoner's right of privacy
must be determined by reference to the cases where the subject of the picture
has been an ordinary citizen. Many courts have recognized this right of privacy, and have held that the unauthorized publication of one's picture is a violation of the rights In the principal case the right was upheld practically without discussion. Since the prisoner was in custody, and therefore unable to
defend himself against the actions of the photographer, it was quite proper for
the court to intervene in his behalf and so protect him, by any reasonable means,
from such obnoxious publicity. Both the attempted confiscation of the negative,
and the order issued at the opening of court seem a proper and sound exercise
'Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, i5o Pac. 1122 (1915).
'Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, i5 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (I9O5), on second appeal,
La. 708, 42 So. 228 (i9o6); Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So.

117
227 (1906).

'There are two theories. That it is a "personal right" was held in Pavesich
v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. Igo, 5o S. E. 68 (1904). That it is a "property right" was held in Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. lO76
(igo). Some courts have refused to recognize the right on any theory:
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (i92)
;
Henry v. Cherry, 30 R. I. 13, 73 At. 97 (Igog) ; Hiliman v. Star Publishing
Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (1911).
'Howard v. State, 237 Pac. 203 (Ariz.
1910) 45.

1925)

; OSWALD,
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(3d ed.
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of the court's discretion." Therefore, the wilful deceit practiced on the judge
and the deliberate violations of his orders were clearly contempts of court'6 It
was a novel, but commendable, use of the contempt power.
EmrNENT DOMAIN-COMPE-NSATIoN-DAMAES FOR Loss OF Goo-WI.nThe plaintiff had been engaged in business at a particular location for a number
of years and had built up, as an attribute of that location, a valuable good-will.
The state under eminent domain proceedings took the property for public use
paying only the market value. The plaintiff now sues for payment of damages
for the destruction of the good-will. Held: The plaintiff cannot recover. People v. JohMon & Co., 219 N. Y. Supp. 741 (1927).
Good-will has been defined by courts,' text writers,' and lexicographers.!
The definitions, while differing in phraseology, all recognize that location is an
important element of good-will. This was conceded in the.principal case, but,
nevertheless, the court refused to award any damages for its destruction. The
court is not alone in this view. It is uniformly held in the United States that
the loss or diminution of the good-will of a business, caused by the condemnation of the land on which the business is located, is not an element of damages
or compensation.' The decisions rest on he reasoning ha such loss is a
damnum absque injuria,' or else that any damages awarded would be of too
speculative a nature. Upon analysis, it seems that the reasons assigned are
more specious than real. Good-will, like any other intangible item of property,
may be difficult to evaluate, but the difficulty is only a technical one at best.
While courts refuse to allow anything foi the loss of good-will T yet they rec'Cabot v. Yarborough, 27 Ga. 476 (I858); West v. State, x Wis. 209, 235
(1853) ; RAPAIJ, CONTEMPT (887) ii.
'Re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157, 168 (1874); Re Cohen, 5 Cal. 494 (1855);
RAALJE, Op. Cit supra note 5, 45.
"'Good-will is the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed
therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement which
it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position
or common celebrity or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from
other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities
or prejudices." STORY, PARTNERSHIP, (7th ed. i88i) § 99, approved in Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U. S.436, 446 (1893).
"'Good-will consists of three things, the natural advantages of the site, the
erection of a suitable building or structure with its proper mechanical equipment
and the good reputation that results from skillful, enterprising and honest management of the business." HOPKINS, TRADEMARKS ( 4 th ed. 1924) 218.
"'Good-will is the degree of favor enjoyed by a particular shop or trade
as indicated by its custom." 4 CENTURY DICTIONxARY (1914) 2574.
"United States v. Inlots, Fed. Cas. No. 15,441 (1873) ; Williams v. Commonwealth, i68 Mass. 364, 47 N. E. 115 (1897) ; Cox v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R.,
215 Pa. 5o6, 64 Ad. 729 (i9o6).
'Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac. 705
(1915).
'Banner Mill Co. v. State, 24o N. Y. 533, 148 N. E. 668 (1925).
2 LEwis, EMINENT DomAiN, (3d ed. i9o9) i276.
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ognize if the particular use to which the property is devoted has continued for
a long time and has imparted to the property a peculiar value for that use, as
for a hotel, it is proper to show the fact and to take it into consMeration in
fixing the damages.' This is in effect, allowing recovery in a situation that
often resembles good-will. Both English and Canadian courts have allowed
recovery for the loss of good-will, on the ground that good-will is part of the
owner's interest in the premiies.' It is submitted that such decisions recognize
the true nature of good-will.
INTOXICATING LIQuoRs-PossEsSION FOR NoN-BEERAGE PURPOSEs-PENN-

ACT OF 1923-Defendant was indicted for illegally possessing intoxicating liquor in violation of the Pennsylvania Act of I923,' known as the
Snyder Act. After the Commonwealth proved the possession, the defendant,
admitting the purchase of the liquor without a physician's prescription, explained
that it had been obtained and was used solely for medicinal purposes. The trial
court instructed the jury that this explanation did not constitute a defense when
the defendant admitted that he had not procured the liquor on a physician's
prescription. Held: The charge was prejudicial. The defendant was entitled
to an acquittal if he could satisfy the jury that he did not possess the whiskey
for beverage purposes. Commonwealth v. Berdenella, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, decided March 14, 1927, reversing Commonwealth v. Berdenella, 87
Pa. Super. 594 (1926).
The judge's charge had been sustained in the Superior Court on the ground
that a liberal interpretation of the Snyder Act should be made, and that court
in effect, held the provisions of the Volstead Act 2 should be read into it. In
reversing this judgment, the majority' of the Supreme Court reasoned that this
was not a prosecution under the Volstead Act, nor a proceeding charging illegal
holding under that legislation. It was a prosecution under the Pennsylvania
statute. This statute is penal and must, therefore, be strictly construed. Although section I of the Snyder Act states that it is enacted in the exercise of
power granted in the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, it nowhere
attempts to incorporate the criminal provisions of the Volstead Act. The correctness of the trial court's ruling must, therefore, be determined from the
express provisions of the Pennsylvania statute. Nowhere in the Act is the
illegal acquirement of liquor made an offense, but the crimes defined deal solely
with the manufacturing, selling, or offering to sell, bartering, furnishing, possessing or delivering of liquor for beverage purposes. Section 13 of the statute
does not justify the ruling of the trial court, as contended by the CommonSYLVANIA

'King v. Minneapolis, etc., Ry., 32 Minn. 223, 20 N. W. 135 (1884).
"Senior v. Metropolitan, etc., R. R., 2 H. & C. 258 (1863) ; White v. Public
Work Commissioners, 22 L. T. (N. S.) 591 (1870) ; Re McCauley, 15 Ont. Rep.
416 (Canada 1889). Cf. Newark v. Cook, 133 Ati. 875 (N. J. 1926).
'Act of 1923, P. L. 34, §3, Pa. Stat (Supp. 1924), § I4o98a-3.
241
Stat. 305, Title II, § 6, p. 310, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1925) § 10138ic.
3
Schaffer, Walling and Simpson, JJ., dissented on the ground expressed in
the decision of the Superior Court.
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wealth, for that section is headed "Evidence and Pleadings," and defines no
criminal offense whatsoever. Moreover, the title of the Snyder Act is: "Concerning Alcoholic Liquors-Prohibiting the manufacture, advertising, furnishing, traffic in and possession of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes . . .,"
and it is well settled that it could not constitutionally be enforced except as to
matters set forth in the title, or germane thereto. The defendant, therefore,
can be convicted solely of the crime of possessing intoxicating liquor for beverage
purposes. And, although section 13 of the Act provides that proof of the possession by the defendant shall be prima facie evidence that it was secured for
beverage purposes, the defendant had a right to rebut that statutory presumption.' He should have been permitted to do so, and the trial court should have
charged the jury that it was a good defense if he could satisfy them that he did
not possess the whiskey for beverage purposes.
See the comment on the Superior Court's decision in this case in 75 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 187 (1926).

MASTER AND SERVANT-THE FAMmY PURPOSE DocTrNE-The defendant
purchased an automobile for the use of himself and family. His son, who was
nineteen years of age and a licensed driver, used the car to attend a dance. An
acident occurred in which the minor son of the plaintiff, who accompanied the
defendant's son, was killed as a result of the latter's negligence in operating the
car. Held: Parent not liable. Piquet v. Wazelle, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, decided March 14, 1927.
This decision following the recent cases of Markle v. Perot1 and Calmon v.
Sperry' definitely indicates the complete rejection of the family purpose doctrine by Pennsylvania. The discussion provoked by this pressing subject has
resulted in the crystallization of two opposing views, one view adopting the
family purpose doctrine, the other rejecting it. Those courts which adopt the
doctrine do so on the theory that the car is provided for the members of the
family and when the son uses it for his own pleasure he is acting as the agent
or servant of his father in the course of his employment.' This peculiar fiction,
at once illogical and unconvincing, arose out of the necessity of establishing a
master-servant relationship as a basis of liability. The other view supported by
the principal case logically reasons that inasmuch as the son is entirely on a
frolic of his own there is no basis for applying the doctrine of respondeat supe"New Hampshire v. La Pointe, 8i N. H.
n. i222. See also 33 C. J. 743.

227,

123 Atl. 692, 3 A. L. R. 1212,

Pa. 4, 116 Atl. 542 (1922).
1276 Pa. 273, 118 Atl. (1923).
1273

'See 71 U. oF PA. LAw REV. 65 for a review of the Pennsylvania cases
prior to Markle v. Perot, supra note I.
'Graham v. Page, '300 Ill. 40, 132 N. E. 817 (192i) ; King v. Smythe, 140
Tenn. 217, 204 S. W. 296 (i918); Jones v. Cook, 9o W. Va. 710, III S. E. 828
(1922).
'SALmOND,
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rior and consequently no liability.' The consideration of policy and public expediency may well call for the result reached under the family purpose doctrine
but the remedy should be with the legislature rather than the courts."
PARTNERSHIP-PARTNERSHIP AT WILL-RIGHT OF PR-Emi>ToN-Two persons entered into a partnership. agreement for a period of three years. The
defendant was given the right to purchase the interest of the plaintiff in the
firm at any time during the term. This right was not exercised by the defendant until the term had long expired, the association in the meantime having
been extended as a partnership at will. Held: The pre-emptive clause was not
inconsistent with a partnership at will and was carried into the agreement as

extended.

Corr v. Hoffman, 219 N. Y. Supp. 656 (1927).

When an agreement of partnership for a specified term is continued thereafter by mutual consent, such provisions as are not inapplicable to a partnership
at will are carried forward as provisions of the new agreement.1 As a general
rule, a clause giving a right of pre-emption to one of the partners is not in itself
inconsistent with the incidents of a partnership at will, and is therefore operaIt has
tive after the termination of the partnership originally contemplated
been said' that such an arrangement is in reality a mode of winding-up which
is not less applicable to a partnership at will than to a contract having a definite
term of duration. But in a particular case the right of pre-emption may be
specially conditioned as to be applicable only at the expiration of the original
agreement, or it may be created in such terms as to show that the agreement
was that it should apply solely at the expiration of the original contract. No
American cases have been found on this point although there are several English
cases. Thus, where one of the clauses provided that if A, one of the partners,
predeceased B during the term, B should have the option of purchasing A's
interest, or of continuing it in the business, it was held the pre-emptive clause
was not carried over into the subsequent partnership at will because the second
alternative was obviously inapplicable to a partnership at will. In another case,'
it was agreed inter alia that three months at least before the expiration of the
contract of partnership, the partners should ascertain whether all were willing
to continue the concern, and if not, those who desired to retire were to so
"Arkin v. Page, 287 IIl. 42o, 1:23 N. E. 30 (1919) ; Doran v. Thompson,

76 N. J. L. 754, 71 Atl. 296 (19o8) ; Van Blaricom v. Dodgson,

220

N. Y. III,

115 N. E. 443 (1917).

'For a discussion of this phase of the subject see 8 A. B. A. J. 359

(1922).

'ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP ACT, 1890, § 27; UNIFORzt PARTNERSHIP ACT,
This was also the common law. Bradley v. Chamberlin, 16 Vt. 613

§ 23 (I).
(844).

'Cox v. Willoughby, 13 Ch. D. 863 (i88o); Brooks v. Brooks, 85 L. T. R.
453 (igoi); McGown v. Henderson, 1914 S. C. 839 (Scot.); LINDLEY, PARTN-ERSHIp (9th ed. 1924) 499.
'Neilson v. Mossend Iron Co., Ii App. Cas. 298, 309 (i886).
'Murphy v. Power, I Ir. Ch. 68 (1923).
'Neilson v. Mossend Iron Co., ii App. Cas. 298 (1886). See also Cookson
v. Cookson, 8 Sim. 529 (Eng. 1837).
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declare, and sell out to the remaining partners. This clause was held inconsistent with a partnership at will wherein a partner may retire instantly provided
he acts in good faith. In the instant case there were no special conditions of
this nature to modify the general rule of law which was applied.
PARTNERSHIP-TRANSFER OF Fni
PROPERTY TO ONE PARTNER-BuLH
SALEs AcT-A partner sold out his undivided one-half interest in the stock and
other assets of the firm to his co-partner. The parties did not give the notice
to creditors required by the Bulk Sales Act,' which Act, it is contended, governed the sale. The trustee in bankruptcy of the retired partner seeks to compel the purchasing partner to account for the value of the selling partner's interest in the stock and fixtures at the time of the sale. Held: The sale does not
come within the Bulk Sales Act. Schnoeppel v. Pfannensteil, 253 Pac. 567
(Kan-1I27).

Bulk Sales Acts have been adopted in practically every state in the union.
Their general purpose is to protect the creditors of merchants from a secret
sale of the whole or large part of a stock of goods by a debtor who slubsequently absconds with the proceeds. The cases involving a sale of a partner's
interest and its status under such acts are few and unharmonious. Georgia and
Indiana courts have reached the same conclusion as that of the principal case.
These decisions proceed on the theory that the Bulk Sales Act being in derogation of the common law right of alienation, should be strictly construed and then
point out that a sale of a partner's half interest is not within the letter of the
law. The court in the instant case reached its conclusion on a different theory,
it being confronted with the Code provision' that all sections of the Code were
to be liberally construed, thus expressly abrogating the aforementioned rule of
construction. The majority of the court, after pointing out the lack of harmony
in the existing decisions, felt that those holding the negative of the proposition
were better supported, because, (i) the remedies of the creditors were not
impaired by the sales, and (2) the wording of the Act contemplates an actual
physical delivery of possession to a stranger. The dissenting opinion reasoned
that the statute was just as necessary to protect the creditors of a part owner
of a stock of goods as those of a full owner. The conclusion of the majority
that a sale of a partner's interest does not affect the remedies of his individual
creditors, it is submitted, is open to question. Before the sale, the interest of
such a partner was generally subject to a charge to the extent of the interest
of the partner in the surplus above firm liabilities.' After the sale, individual
creditors of the retiring partner have no rights at all in the former firm prop'KANs. RLv. STAT. (923) c. 58, § iO. "The sale or disposal of any part
or the whole of a stock of merchandise or the fixtures pertaining thereto, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade or l4usiness, shall be void as against
the creditors 6f the seller, unless the purchaser receives from the seller a
list of names and addresses of the creditors of the seller . . ."
=Taylor v. Folds, 2 Ga. App. 453, 73 S. E. 761 (i9o7) ; Fairfield Shoe Co.
v. Olds, 176 Ind. 526, g6 N. E. 592 (ign).
'KANs. REv. STAT. (1923) c. 58, § io2.
'Brown, Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson Co., i Q. B. 737 (i895); UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 28.
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erty, nor can they charge any interest therein, since full legal and equitable
title rests in the purchasing partner.' To some extent then, (and in some cases
it may be very material), the remedies of the creditors of the partner who has
disposed of his interest have been impaired by the sale. The secret impairment of
the remedies of creditors is precisely what the Bulk Sales Act seeks to prevent.
The second reason advanced by the court is merely a paraphrase on the doctrine
of the Georgia and Indiana cases, namely, that the situation does not come
within the letter of the law. A Tennessee case,' which is contra to the principal
one, attempts to distinguish the contrary decisions on a difference in the wording
of the statute. A legislative determination of the problem is sorely needed to
untangle the enigma.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-RGHTS OF A SURETY ON A PAROL PROMISE OF

FRAUDs-The defendant orally promised to indemnify
the plaintiffs for any loss they would suffer by going surety on supersedeas
bonds of his sons. The plaintiffs, on default of the sons to prosecute their
appeal, were compelled to pay their judgments. The father, being sued jointly
with the sons, defends on the ground that his promise comes within the Statute
of Frauds denying a cause of action upon an oral promise to answer for the
debt or default of another. Held: A promise of indemnity is not within the
Statute of Frauds. Dyer v. Staggs, 290 S. W. 494 (Ky. 1927).
"Jpon no subject, perhaps, has there been more diversity of judicial decision."' The divergence continues, no doubt, because of the conflicting decisions of the leading cases of Thomas v. Cook 2 and Green v. Cresswell. In the
former, which is the majority rule,' it was held that a promise of indemnity
is not within the Statute of Frauds as "answering for the debt or default of
another." In the latter case the court held a promise of indemnity is within the
INDEMNITY-STATUTE OF

5

Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Ves. Jr. iig (Eng. i8oi); Warner v. Woodworking

Co., 2io Fed. 12 (1913); Green v. Whaley, 271 Mo. 636, 197 S. W. 355 (1917).
'Howell v. Howell, I42 Tenn. 31, 215 S. W. 278 (igig).

'Strong, J., in Maule v. Bucknell, 5o Pa. 39 (1865) at 51.
'8 Barn. & Cres. 722 (1828). (Here A orally promised to indemnify B if
the latter would join him as surety on a bond payable to X.)
3 io Ad. & Ell. 453 (1839).
(Here A promised to indemnify B if the latter
would go surety on X's bail bond.) Authorities disagree whether or not this
case necessarily overruled Thomas v. Cook, supra note 2. It has been pointed
out that in Thomas v. Cook, the promise was made by one already liable as
surety and that the promise, therefore, was not one to "answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another person" as provided for in the Statute of
Frauds, but a promise to answer for the defendant's own default. E. C. Arnold,
Indemnity Contracts and the Statute of Frauds, 9 MINN. L. REv 401, 405
(1925). However, it has also been stated that the distinction fails in so far as

the rule of Green v. Cresswell asserted that the defendant's promise of indemnity
was collateral to the third party's implied liability and so must be regarded in
direct conflict with Thomas v. Cook. I BROWNE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (5th ed.
1895) § 6ia.
'Wolthausen v. Trimpert, 93 Conn. 26o (igig); Hawes v. Murphy, i9I
Mass. 469, 78 N. E. Iog (i9o6) ; Tighue v. Morrison, 116 N. Y. 263 (I889).
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statute if such promise is collateral to the coexistent obligation of the principal
to the promisee. In the principal case, when the plaintiff promisee signed as
surety for the sons upon the father's request there arose an implied obligation
on their part to reimburse their surety if he (the surety) were damnified by
reason of their default. The oral promise of the defendant to indemnify the
plaintiff, under the minority view,' following Greei; v. Cresszwell,' would then be
a collateral undertaking to answer for the default of another and, therefore,
would come within the statute. The courts, following the rule of Thotwis v.
Cook, go on the theory that the coexistent obligation of the third party is not
independent of the promisor's undertaking, but arises only as an incident of it.
Therefore, not being collateral to any obligation having an independent existence, before, or after, or contemporaneous with the oral promise of indemnity,
it was not within the statute. If it can be found that the undertaking by the
promisor was to subserve his own interest, or that the promisor was primarily
liable to the promisee without regard to the concurrent obligation of the third
party to the promisee, then even the courts under the minority view hold that
the undertaking would be an original one, notwithstanding its effect would be
to pay the debt of another.? Or if the promise of the defendant was made to
the debtor, it is well settled that such agreement is not within the Statute of
Frauds.' Here the obligation of the third party was truly but a mere incident
to the defendant's promise.
'Posten v. Clem, 2ol Ala. 529, 78 So. 883 (i9i8); Hartley v. Sandford, 66
N. J. L. 627 (igoi) ; Nugent v. Wolfe, iii Pa. 471, 4 Atl. 15 (i886).
' Green v. Cresswell, supra note 3, was thought to have been overruled by
Reader v. Kingham, 13 C. B. N. S. 343 (1862) and as such was dealt with in
Wildes v. Ludlow L. R. ig Eq. I98 (1874). Whatever doubt may have existed
was dispelled after the decision of that case, for by it the doctrine of Thomas v.
Cook was reaffirmed.
'Kirby v. Kirby, 248 Pa. iig (i915). In Nugent v. Wolfe, supra note 6,
it was said at 480, "On the other hand, when the leading object of the promisor is
to subserve some interest or purpose of his own, notwithstanding the effect is to
pay or discharge the debt of another, his promise is not within the statute." In
Maule v. Bucknell, supra note i, it was said at 52, "Where the contract shows
an intention of the parties that the new promisor shall become the principal
debtor and the old debtor become but secondarily liable . . . the promise is
not within the statute."
"It has been held that the promise of indemnity was made to the surety as
a debtor. To quote, "This is a promise by the defendant to another to pay his
debt, or, in other words, to save him from the performance of an obligation
(which he assumed as surety) which might result in a debt. But it is a promise
to the debtor to pay his debt, and thereby to relieve him from the payment of it
himself, which is not within the Statute of Frauds." Adrich v. Ames, 9 Gray
76 (Mass., 1857). Cf. May v. Williams, 61 Miss. 125 (1883), where the court
at 132 said, "It cannot be said that the promise io indemnify the surety is made
to him as debtor and not as creditor. . . . It is only when the promisee has
changed his relationship of debtor to the state (the fourth party to whom as
surety he became liable when the third party defaulted) and assumed that of
creditor to his principal, . . . that a right arises to go against the guarantor
on his contract. It is to one who is under a conditional and contingent liability
that the promise is made; but it is to him as creditor, and not as debtor, that
a right of action arises on it."
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SEARCHES AND

SEARCH WITHOUT

SEIZtjRES--ADMISSIBILITY

OF EVIDENCE ACQUIRED BY A

WARANT-While making a search of certain premises under

a search warrant, a sheriff smelled fumes of mash coming from a barn nearby
on the premises of the defendant. Without a warrant for these latter premises,
he entered the barn and found a still in operation. Defendant was indicted for
the misdemeanor of possessing mash fit for the manufacture of intoxicating
liquor. A conviction is appealed from on the ground that all the evidence
obtained through the search and seizure should have been suppressed because the
search was in violation of article I, section 9 of the Oregon constitution. Held:
Conviction affirmed. State v. Lee, 253 Pac. 533 (Ore. 1926).
Courts have differed widely in their allowance of the right to search without
warrant. The common law prohibited all searches without warrant, except
those in connection with a legal arrest? But since the Constitution of the
United States, like that of Oregon, prohibits only unreasonable searches, it has
been held that the reasonableness of the search and not the presence or absence
of a warrant is the test of the legality of the search.' The federal rule in
regard to the search of automobiles has been definitely settled in the case of
Carroll v. U. S., in which it was held that a federal officer without a warrant
has the right to search an automobile when he has probable cause to believe an
offense is being committed against the Prohibition Act. But the language of
the court carefully limits the right to the search of vehicles which can be
quickly moved out of the district, recognizing a difference in the cases of
"stores, dwellings or other structures in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained."' The principal case holds that where an officer
has probable cause to believe a violation of the prohibition law is being committed, he has a right to search premises without a warrant. The argument of
the court was that a crime was being committed in the officer's presence. And
they said that an officer should be able to search without a warrant in the same
way that he is allowed to arrest without a warrant where a crime is committed
in his presence. The court's position is sustained by other cases,' although it
has been recently pointed out that the law never gave the right to arrest without
warrant for a misdemeanor unless it was a breach of the peace,' and the same
reasoning applies to searches. Searches are arbitrary and dangerous to the
"No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
papers, houses and effects against unreasonable search and seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized," a provision similar to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
'In re Swan, I5o U. S. 637 (1893); People v. Halveksz, 215 Mich. 136,
183 N. W. 752 (1921).
'Moore v. State, 138 Miss. iI6, 103 So. 485; CORNEUUS, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE (1926) § 49. Cf. Skipworth, The Law of Search and Seizure, 3 ORE.
L. REV. 179 (1924).
1267 U. S. 132, 39 A. L. R. 790 (1925).

'Supra note 4, at 153.
'McBride v. U. S., 284 F. 416 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); U. S. v. Apple, I F.
(2d) 493 (D. C. Mont. 1924).
'Bohlen, Arrest With and Without a Warrant, 75 U. op PA. L. REv. 485
(1927).

RECENT CASES
interests of the individual,8 and the principal case seems extreme when it is considered that a search warrant could be obtained without danger of the offender's
escape. The case further seems questionable by calling the barn a distillery, and
thus overcoming the difficulty as to searches of a "dwelling," which has always
been given special protection, and which includes all buildings in the curtillage.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-OPTION-EFFECT OF EXERCISE OF OPTION ON
INTERVENING TIamD P RSONs-One Heald in 1921 leased a part of her building

to C, the lease providing that C or its successors and assigns could purchase
the property within five years. This lease was duly executed and recorded. In
i924 Heald leased another portion of the building to the defendant. Plaintiff,
as assignee of C's lease, exercised the option in 1925 and purchased the property,
the deed not being taken subject to the defendant's lease which had not yet
expired. The plaintiff declined to recognize the defendant's lease and upon the
latter's refusal to agree to a new lease brought this action of ejectment. Held:
For defendant. Durfee House Furnishing Co. v.Tea Co., 136 At. 379 (Vt.
1927).

An option to purchase is generally defined as a contract by which an owner
agrees with another person that he shall have the privilege of buying his propIt consists of two elements:
erty at a fixed price within a specified time
(i)" the offer to sell, which does not become a contract until accepted, and (2)
the completed contract to hold the offer open for the time specified The contract of sale only arises upon the exercise of the option and may generally be
enforced either by a decree for damages or specific performance. Furthermore,
according to the weight of authority, the mere option before acceptance does
not vest any interest in the property in the optionee, and the contract of sale
takes effect from the date of acceptance which causes it to come into existence.4
Some courts, however, hold that the optionee obtains an equitable interest in
the property by the option, and that the contract upon acceptance relates back to
the date of the opinion, so as to make the optionee owner as of that date.'
However, one who purchases an interest in the property without knowledge
"Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky.

1

S.W. 86o, 13 A. L. R. 1303
(i89o) 367.

152, 224

(1920); CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LrmITATIONS

Black v. Maddox, 104 Ga. 157, 30 S. E. 723 (x898) ; Ide v. Leiser, 10

Mont. 5, 24 Pac. 695 (i8go).
2Ibid.

3I
AMES, EQUITY JURISDIcTION (1904) 431, n. 2; 36 Cyc. 625 and cases in
footnotes.
'Strong v. Moore, io5 Ore. 12, 207 Pac. 179 (1922) ; Edwards v. West,

7 Ch. D. 858 (1878).
"People's SL Ry. Co. v. Spencer, i56 Pa.'85, 27 Adt. 113 (1893). For
further cases both ways see 39 Cyc. 1238, n. i9. One of the'results of the
minority holding is that if the property having been insured against is burned,
and the option is exercised and a conveyance made after the loss, the purchaser
is entitled to the moneys due on the insurance, being considered as the owner ab
initio. People's St. Ry. Co. v. Spencer, ibid. However, under the majority

view the proceeds are given to the optionor as against the optionee. Supra
note 4.
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of the existence of the option and before it is exercised will not be affected by
the subsequent acceptance
But it is well established that a purchaser with
knowledge of an outstanding valid and enforceable option for the sale of the
property to another will take subject to it, and specific performance of the contract may be decreed against him.! An option to purchase land may be recorded
and when so recorded amounts to notice of its existence as to a subsequent purchaser.' This would appear to.be the position of the parties in the principal case
since the defendant acquired its rights after the lease containing the option was
recorded, and therefore is regarded as taking with knowledge of an outstanding
right in the plaintiff to purchase the property and consequently should take
subject to this right.9 The plaintiff having legal title at the time of the suit
should succeed.
028

L. M. A. (x. s.) 523, note;

27

R. C. L. 342.

'Forney v. City of Birmingham, 173 Ala. i, 55 So. 618 (i9ii); Cummins
v. Beavers, 103 Va. 230, 48 S. E. 891 (19o4). See discussion in 28 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 523, note.

'Fields v. Vizard Invest Co., 168 Ky. 744, 182 S. W. 934 (1916).
' The court in the principal case reached its conclusion on the ground that it
did not recognize the doctrine of "relating back," and even applying that doctrine
the plaintiff could at most only get an equitable interest in the property whereas
only legal title was to be considered in an action of ejectment and that was only
acquired by exercising the option after the defendant secured its lease. However, since the defendant is charged with knowledge of the record, it would
seem that his rights should be subordinated to the rights of the plaintiff whenever they are exercised, and if this is so, there seems to be no necessity for
using the doctrine of "relating back." Assuming that the decision of the court
is correct, because of the nature of the action, there would seem to be no reason
why a court of equity should not lend its aid in the protection of the plaintiff's
rights.

